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Abstract—This paper proposes a distributed framework for
demand response and user adaptation in smart grid networks.
In particular, we borrow the concept of congestion pricing in
Internet traffic control and show that pricing information is very
useful to regulate user demand and hence balance network load.
User preference is modeled as a willingness to pay parameter
which can be seen as an indicator of differential quality of service.
Both analysis and simulation results are presented to demonstrate
the dynamics and convergence behavior of the algorithm.
Index Terms—Smart grid, demand response, pricing, utility.
I. INTRODUCTION
A smart grid is an intelligent electricity network that in-
tegrates the actions of all users connected to it and makes
use of advanced information, control, and communication
technologies to save energy, reduce cost and increase relia-
bility and transparency. Recently, many countries have started
massive efforts on research and developing smart grids. For
example, the smart grid is a vital component of President
Obama’s comprehensive energy plan: the American Recovery
and Investment Act includes 11 billion USD in investments
to “jump start the transformation to a bigger, better, smarter
grid”.
In electricity grids, demand response (DR) is a mechanism
for achieving energy efficiency through managing customer
consumption of electricity in response to supply conditions,
e.g., having end users reduce their demand at critical times
or in response to market prices. In the future smart grid, the
two way communications between energy provider and end
users enabled by advanced communication infrastructure (e.g.,
wireless sensor networks and power line communications) and
protocols will greatly enhance demand response capabilities
of the whole system. In contrast to the current simple time-
of-use (TOU) pricing (e.g. peak time vs. off-peak time), it
can be envisaged that a more dynamic, real-time adaptation
to market prices would not only enable consumers to save
more energy and money, as well as manage their usage pref-
erences more flexibly, but also facilitate the grid move closer
towards its optimal operating point. For a recent overview of
challenges and issues of enabling communication technologies
in this area, please refer to [1]. The authors of [2] argue that
demand response and distributed energy storage can be seen as
distributed energy resources and are main drivers of smart grid.
While DR can help the industry to achieve market efficiency
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and operational reliability, there are also challenges ahead in
implementing DR under smart grid and market paradigms.
There are a few papers recently on smart grid DR using load
scheduling. In [3], user preferences are taken into account with
the concept of discomfort level and an optimization problem
is formulated to balance the load and minimize the user in-
convenience caused by demand scheduling. Several ideas from
the distributed computing area such as makespan have been
introduced to energy consumption optimization. Similarly, in
[4], an energy consumption scheduling problem is established
to minimize the overall energy cost. Techniques similar to
those used in wireless network resource allocation have been
applied here to solve the underlying optimization problem. In
both works, the user demands are known beforehand and the
optimization problem is solved in numerical iterations.
In this paper, we consider a fully distributed system where
the only information available to the end users is the current
price which is dependent on the overall system load. Based on
this information, the users try to adapt their demands so as to
maximize their own utility. There is no central control entity.
Inspired by the well-established work on congestion pricing in
IP networks, we propose a simple adaptation strategy based on
price feedbacks and show that it is very effective in achieving
demand response.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces our DR model and the adaptation algorithm. We
present some simulation results in Section 3. Conclusions and
future work are presented in Section 4.
II. DEMAND RESPONSE MODEL
A. Congestion pricing background
In this paper we propose to apply the principle of congestion
pricing in IP networks to demand response in the electricity
grid. In their seminal paper [5], Kelly et al. have proposed
the proportionally fair pricing (PFP) scheme in which each
user declares a price per unit time that he is willing to pay
for his flow. In that sense the network capacity is shared
among the flows of all users in proportion to the prices paid
by the users. It has been shown in [5] that in a weighted
proportionally fair system where the weights are the prices the
users pay per unit time, when each user chooses the price that
maximizes the utility she gets from the network, the system
converges to a state where the total utility of the network is
maximized. In other words, in an ideal environment, the PFP
proposal is able to decentralize the global optimal allocation
of congestible resources. Another important result of [5] is
that rate control (such as TCP) based on additive increase and
2multiplicative decrease achieves proportional fairness. It has
been proved in [6] that the decentralized congestion control
mechanism is stable even under arbitrary network topologies
and heterogeneous round trip times (feedback delays).
In Kelly’s approach, the philosophy is that users who are
willing to pay more should get more. As the network makes
no explicit promises to the user, there is no need for over
provisioning in the core of the network. One implementation
of PFP is to give control to end systems (users). In this scheme,
the TCP algorithm is modified to incorporate congestion prices
by means of protocols like explicit congestion notification
(ECN) [7]. Upon receiving feedback signals, f(t), which are
related to shadow prices (in terms of packet marks), the users
are free to react as they choose, but will incur charges when
resources are congested. An end system can adjust its rate x(t)
using a willingness to pay (WTP) parameter w:
x(t + 1) = x(t) + α(w − f(t)), (1)
where α affects the rate of convergence of the algorithm.
In [8], explicit prices instead of marks are fed back to the
end users as incentives and users adapt their rates accordingly.
It has been shown that the system converges to an optimal
allocation of bandwidth: the users’ price predictions converge
to the actual price and their bandwidth allocations converge
to levels which equalize their marginal utility of bandwidth to
the price of bandwidth.
B. The DR model and user adaptation
We consider a discrete time slot system where N users
share some energy resources. In each time slot n, user i has a
demand of xi(n) (e.g. hourly energy consumption if the time
granularity is one hour). The unit price of energy in a time
slot is a function of the aggregate demand:
p(n) = f(
N∑
i=1
xi(n)). (2)
The price function (spot market price) can be of the following
form [3][9]:
f(x) = a(
x
C
)k, (3)
where a and k are constants, and C is the capacity of the
market.
Each user i is associated with a utility function ui(xi(n))
in time slot n, which is a concave, non-decreasing function of
its demand. A typical logarithmic utility function is given by
[5]:
ui(x) = wi log x, (4)
where wi is the willingness to pay parameter. Hence user i
chooses its demand xi(n) to seek to maximize
ui(xi(n))− xi(n)p(n). (5)
We would like to elaborate on a few assumptions made
in the above model. Firstly, in our model the demand x is a
continuous variable, which may not be realistic in practice. For
example, in real life, the daily usages of a washing machine
and a dryer are (fixed as) 1.49 kWh and 2.50 kWh respectively.
Here the adaptation of x can be seen as an action of load
scheduling: for example, re-scheduling a dryer operation from
time slot n = 1 to slot n = 3 leads to x(1) reduced by
2.50 kW per hour and x(3) increased by 2.50 kW per hour.
Secondly, how to characterize user preference is an open issue.
For instance, a user may prefer his washing done at 6pm which
is a typical peak time. To some extent, this preference can be
reflected in the WTP parameter w in (4): when a user is willing
to pay more, he/she can have a higher demand. However, the
delay (or waiting time) incurred due to rescheduling is not
considered in this model. Thirdly, as pointed out in [5], log-
arithmic utility functions lead to proportional fairness. There
are other types of utility functions available corresponding to
different fairness criteria, e.g. ui(x) = wi x
β
−1
β
, β < 1 as
proposed in [8]. How to choose a most suitable utility function
in DR applications is an open issue, e.g. how to factor in the
waiting time and user discomfort level [3].
User i adapts its demand according to the following equa-
tion:
xi(n+ 1) = xi(n) + αi(wi − xi(n)p(n)), (6)
where αi is a parameter that controls the rate of convergence
of the algorithm. It is clear that the user adjusts her demand
according to the price information (p(n)) and her own will-
ingness to pay preference (w).
To show that the above adaptation converges to the user
optimum, let us assume that the equilibrium price is q. Then
by solving u′i(xi(n)) = q, we have the optimal demand x∗i as
x∗i =
wi
q
. (7)
Given (6), the error of demand estimate, ei(n + 1), is given
by
ei(n+1) = xi(n+1)− x
∗
i = xi(n)+αi(wi− xi(n)q)−
wi
q
.
(8)
Then it follows that
ei(n+ 1) = (1− αiq)(xi(n)−
wi
q
) = (1 − αiq)ei(n). (9)
Therefore ei(n) is a geometric series, and when |1 − αiq| <
1, limn→∞ ei(n) = 0. This has established that with properly
chosen αi, the adaptation will converge to the optimum.
Following [5], it is also straightforward to establish the global
stability of the algorithm in a differential equation form (10)
using an appropriate Lyapunov function.
d
dt
xi(t) = αi(wi − xi(t)p(t)). (10)
C. Implementation considerations
In a residential energy management scenario, we envisage
that each user in our model is represented by an entity or
software agent called home energy manager (HEM) at a
consumer’s home. Appliances in the home are equipped with
smart meters, and they communicate with HEM via low power
wireless such as ZigBee. HEM is further connected to the grid
(supplier) via either wired or wireless links. Based on the price
information it receives, HEM calculates demand in the next
3Fig. 1. Distributed demand response
time slot and distributes it to different appliances. The overall
architecture is shown in Figure 1.
We note that some appliances like refrigerator and heating
have hard consumption scheduling requirements, while others
such as washing machine have soft requirements [4]. When
HEM has to shift the demand to another time slot, it may
apply only to soft appliances. For example, HEM obtains
x(n + 1) based on (6) with WTP parameter w. If it can
satisfy the demand from the hard appliances (denoted by h), it
can re-schedule the demand from some of the soft appliances
(denoted by s) so that x(n + 1) = h(n + 1) + s(n + 1).
On the other hand, if it cannot meet the demand from the
hard appliances, HEM may have to increase w and recalculate
x(n+ 1).
III. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we use simulations to study the behavior and
dynamics of the proposed algorithm. There are N = 10 users
and without loss of generality we assume that the capacity C
is 1. For the price function (3), a = 1, k = 4.
A. Basic simulation
Here all the users initiate their demands at 0.02, and their
willingness to pay parameters range from 0.11 (user 1) to 0.20
(user 10). All the users have the same adaptation parameter
α of 0.1. Figure 2 shows the demand changes with time for
10 users. After a short transient period, each user demand
converges to a stable value (determined by different w values).
It is also evident that w is a crucial factor in determining how
aggressive a user should be responding to the price signals.
Figure 3 clearly shows that the price converges to the optimal
value. When the system reaches its equilibrium (assuming a =
1, C = 1), we have
xi =
wi
(
∑N
i=1 xi(n))
k
. (11)
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Fig. 2. Simulation III-A: demand adaptation of 10 users
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Fig. 3. Simulation III-A: price evolution
Summing over i on both sides of (11), it is easy to verify that
the price at equilibrium is
p = (
N∑
i=1
wi(n))
k
k+1 . (12)
In this case, p = 1.42 as shown in Figure 3.
B. The effect of α
In this simulation experiment we study the effect of α on
system performance. Figure 4 and Figure 5 depict the demand
and price evolution versus time respectively for α = 0.17.
Compared with Figure 2 and Figure 3, it can be seen that with
a larger α, it takes much longer to converge. Therefore α is
an important system parameter that controls the convergence
speed of the process.
C. Heterogeneous initial demands
In this simulation experiment we study the effect of hetero-
geneity of initial demands, i.e., ten users start with demands
ranging from 0.01 to 0.10 respectively. The results are shown
in Figure 6 and Figure 7. We observe that different initial
conditions do not affect the system stability and convergence
to equilibrium.
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Fig. 4. Simulation III-B: demand adaptation of 10 users
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Fig. 5. Simulation III-B: price evolution
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Fig. 6. Simulation III-C: demand adaptation of 10 users
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Fig. 7. Simulation III-C: price evolution
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Fig. 8. Simulation III-D: demand adaptation of 10 users
D. Heterogeneous initial demands and adaptation rates
In addition to heterogeneous initial demands as in last
simulation, here users also have different adaptation rates αi:
ranging from 0.11 to 0.20. The results are shown in Figure 8
and Figure 9, where we can see that the system still converges
to the equilibrium.
E. Time-varying w
To model the situation where users change their WTP w on-
the-fly to accommodate their energy needs, we change wi’s at
time slot 100 by adding a random number within the region
of (−0.05, 0.05). Figure 10 and Figure 11 clearly show that
after time 100, the system tracks the change nicely to a new
equilibrium.
F. The effect of C
The energy provider can influence the price by adjusting
the capacity C. As shown in Figure 12 and Figure 13, when
C is doubled, the price will drop by 1−C
k
k+1 which is 43%,
and each user’s demand will increase accordingly.
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Fig. 9. Simulation III-D: price evolution
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Fig. 10. Simulation III-E: demand adaptation of 10 users
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Fig. 11. Simulation III-E: price evolution
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Fig. 12. Simulation III-F: demand adaptation of 10 users
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Fig. 13. Simulation III-F: price evolution
G. Inaccurate price signals
The feedback price signals are transmitted via a communi-
cation network (e.g. GPRS) to the HEM, during which packet
loss and delay could occur. In this case users may have to
adapt their demands based on outdated or inaccurate price
information. We model this situation as a small perturbation
to the price signal and study its effect on the system behavior.
As shown in Figure 14 and Figure 15, the price and demands
still converge to the means of the equilibrium values, but with
small fluctuations. A more detailed perturbation analysis is
part of our future work.
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper proposes a distributed framework for demand
response and user adaptation in smart grid networks. More
specifically, we have applied the concept of congestion pricing
in Internet traffic control to the DR problem and shown that it
is possible that the burden of load leveling can be shifted from
the grid (or supplier) to end users via pricing. Individual users
adapt to the price signals to maximize their own benefits. User
preference is modeled as a willingness to pay parameter which
can be seen as an indicator of differential quality of service.
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Fig. 14. Simulation III-G: demand adaptation of 10 users
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Fig. 15. Simulation III-G: price evolution
The convergence of the algorithm has been demonstrated by
both analysis and simulation results.
This paper is just a first step towards our vision of fully
distributed demand response. There are a number of directions
for future research. Firstly, the proposed model fits nicely into
the game theory framework. In fact, there is already a rich
literature in the networking community on game theoretical
analysis of congestion pricing, e.g. [10]. In Kelly’s framework,
the user and social optima coincide if the prices are right,
and the social optimum is a Nash bargaining solution with
the logarithmic utility function. More recently, researchers
have applied intelligent agents and game theory to micro-
storage management for the smart grid [11], in which Nash
equilibrium is reached when the agents are able to optimize
the energy usage and storage profile of the dwelling and learn
the best storage profile given market prices at any particular
time. Similarly, based on our model, it would be interesting
to study the system dynamics and user interaction in a large
scale energy demand game context. There are two types of
user strategies: price taking users and price anticipating users
[12]. A price taking user assumes that he has no effect on the
price of the energy, whereas a price anticipating user realizes
that his own choice of wi affects the price. An interesting
observation is that price anticipating users tend to pay less.
One important element of intelligence in the smart grid
is the learning capability of various components. In demand
response, if users can learn from past observations (e.g. prices
and load profiles), then they can predict the future load and
price and adjust their strategies accordingly (e.g. adjusting αi
and wi). In this context, Bayesian networks and reinforcement
learning are some of the powerful tools we can leverage to
enable learning in this highly dynamic environment.
As mentioned earlier, demand scheduling can be formulated
as a typical resource allocation problem, for which a wide
range of techniques (many of them have been applied in
the networking field) are available. We are currently inves-
tigating the feasibility of applying some convex optimization
techniques such as water-filling to demand side management,
where a certain cost function is to be minimized subject to a
number of system constraints.
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